Forms of Skepticism
Posted: 31 Jul 2011, 04:14
...here's a book reviewed you may want to read.
Most anti-skeptics probably think of skepticism in the sense that emphasizes doubt and the impossibility of knowledge as opposed to the new skepticism, which focuses on inquiry and the real possibility of knowledge.
Paul Kurtz: A Titan of Skepticism
PETER LA MAL
Exuberant Skepticism. By Paul Kurtz. Edited by John R. Shook. Prometheus Books,
This set of previously published writings by Paul Kurz, spanning three
decades, can serve as an invaluable introduction for those who are unfamiliar with contemporary skepticism. And there are doubtless many inthat category. The first of Exuberant Skepticism's four sections,
"Reasons to Be Skeptical," asks what a skeptic is. The answer: a skeptic is a person who is willing to question any claim to truth and to test truth claims by the criteria described in this book and the work of other skeptics.
So, just what is skepticism? Kurtz identifies three varieties. Nihilistic skepticism is the complete rejection of all claims to truth or value; it claims there is no truth at all. Mitigated skepticism is the view that ultimate rrurhs about what is real cannot be established with any
certainly. The experiences of living require us to make some generalizations, but we cannot make any ultimate claims as to their truth. Kurtz calls the form of skepticism he champions skeptical inquiry. He says that, contrary to earlier forms of skepticism, skeptical inquiry is positive and constructive; it is an essential part of the process of inquiry but
Peter Lamal is an emeritus professor of psychology at the University of North Carolina*Charlotte and a fellow of the Division of Behavior Analysis of the American Psychological Association.
Skeptical inquiry maintains that we should never a priori refuse well-based investigation of claims. At the same rime, when adequate justification for claims is not forthcoming, this form of skepticism will assert that such claims are unproved, unlikely, or false. "The key principle of skeptical inquiry is to seek, when feasible, adequate evidence and reasonable grounds for any claim to truth in any context" (p. 21).
How do we search for adequate evidence, and what are "reasonable grounds" for accepting truth claims? We search by means of the scientific method,and in the chapter
"Scientific Method and Rational Skepticism," Kurtz describes
what he considers its three important criteria: 1) collection of relevant evidence, 2) logical consistency, and 3) technological and experimental consequences.
The chapter "Skepticism and the New Enlightenment" maintains that in recent years there has been a massive retreat from Enlightenment ideals, exemplified by a worldwide resurgence of fundamentalist religions. The world needs a New Enlightenment whose distinctive characteristics would be: an extension of scientific methods and reason to all areas of human interest, a response to the existential question about the meaning of life, humanistic ethics as the basis for a new morality and universal human rights.
The need for a New Enlightenment is also underscored by the growth of anti-science, and Kurtz describes ten kinds. One basic reason for the growth of anti-science is the failure to educate the public about the nature of science. It is time, Kurtz says, for scientists and the scientifically literate to come forward to explain what science is as well as its practical effects. Last July I pointed out in an article in the Charlotte Observer, 'A Need to Engage the Public in Science," that according to a National Science Foundation report, science ranks behind ten other subjects in terms of people's interest. Politicians are an important part of the problem. By and large they reflect their constituents' and society lack of interest in science. Following Chris Mooney and Sheril Kirshenbaum's proposal in their book Unscientific America; How Scientific illiteracy Threatens Our Future, I pointed out that communicating the relevance of science to the public has been a low priority for scientists. Mooney and Kirshenbaum thus advocate development of a group of scientists who can be "ambassadors" to our larger society. A critical societal segment needing science education is, as Kurtz points out, the mass media.
The book's second section, "skepticism and the Nonnatural," consists of four chapters: one on skepticism and the paranormal and the other three on skepticism and religion, the last of which concerns the question of whether science and religion are compatible.
The third section, "Skepticism in the Human World," consists of a chapter concerning the need for skeptical inquiry in the political domain. Another chapter is devoted to skepticism and ethics. Kurtz describes three types of ethical skepticism. The one favored by Kurtz, ethical inquiry "involves a skeptical component that is never fully abandoned" (131). And in this view, the basic subject matter of ethics is behavior. Moral faith and ethical skepticism are the focus of the next chapter in which a modified form of ethical naturalism is proposed. In the last chapter in this section, Kurtz introduces a new field, eupraxsophy. Eupraxsophers will aim to be generalists able to understand, to the extent they can, what the sciences tell us. They will concern questions about the meaning of life and the relevance of the sciences and the arts to the choices we make. Universities and colleges need to develop the profession of eupraxsophy.
In the book's fourth section,"The Skeptical Movement, Past and Future," Kurtz recounts highlights of the new skepticism's history including his most significant personal activity in developing the enterprise. The book's last chapter is a "Statement of Principles" of the new skepticism.
Those of us of a certain age can remember when any person known to be a skeptic was considered at least deranged and probably unpatriotic, if not dangerous. Because of the indefatigable work of Paul Kurtz and some others, however, I suspect that many skeptics feel less compelled to keep their views to themselves. 'this conjecture is, of course, subject to inquiry. Most anti-skeptics probably think of skepticism in the sense that emphasizes doubt and the impossibility of knowledge as opposed to the new skepticism, which focuses on inquiry and the real possibility of knowledge.
Parts of this book are understandably repetitious-after all, they concern some topics addressed over the course of thirty years. But this could be beneficial for those being introduced to skepticism
SKEPTICAL INQUIRER July / August 2010
Most anti-skeptics probably think of skepticism in the sense that emphasizes doubt and the impossibility of knowledge as opposed to the new skepticism, which focuses on inquiry and the real possibility of knowledge.
Paul Kurtz: A Titan of Skepticism
PETER LA MAL
Exuberant Skepticism. By Paul Kurtz. Edited by John R. Shook. Prometheus Books,
This set of previously published writings by Paul Kurz, spanning three
decades, can serve as an invaluable introduction for those who are unfamiliar with contemporary skepticism. And there are doubtless many inthat category. The first of Exuberant Skepticism's four sections,
"Reasons to Be Skeptical," asks what a skeptic is. The answer: a skeptic is a person who is willing to question any claim to truth and to test truth claims by the criteria described in this book and the work of other skeptics.
So, just what is skepticism? Kurtz identifies three varieties. Nihilistic skepticism is the complete rejection of all claims to truth or value; it claims there is no truth at all. Mitigated skepticism is the view that ultimate rrurhs about what is real cannot be established with any
certainly. The experiences of living require us to make some generalizations, but we cannot make any ultimate claims as to their truth. Kurtz calls the form of skepticism he champions skeptical inquiry. He says that, contrary to earlier forms of skepticism, skeptical inquiry is positive and constructive; it is an essential part of the process of inquiry but
Peter Lamal is an emeritus professor of psychology at the University of North Carolina*Charlotte and a fellow of the Division of Behavior Analysis of the American Psychological Association.
Skeptical inquiry maintains that we should never a priori refuse well-based investigation of claims. At the same rime, when adequate justification for claims is not forthcoming, this form of skepticism will assert that such claims are unproved, unlikely, or false. "The key principle of skeptical inquiry is to seek, when feasible, adequate evidence and reasonable grounds for any claim to truth in any context" (p. 21).
How do we search for adequate evidence, and what are "reasonable grounds" for accepting truth claims? We search by means of the scientific method,and in the chapter
"Scientific Method and Rational Skepticism," Kurtz describes
what he considers its three important criteria: 1) collection of relevant evidence, 2) logical consistency, and 3) technological and experimental consequences.
The chapter "Skepticism and the New Enlightenment" maintains that in recent years there has been a massive retreat from Enlightenment ideals, exemplified by a worldwide resurgence of fundamentalist religions. The world needs a New Enlightenment whose distinctive characteristics would be: an extension of scientific methods and reason to all areas of human interest, a response to the existential question about the meaning of life, humanistic ethics as the basis for a new morality and universal human rights.
The need for a New Enlightenment is also underscored by the growth of anti-science, and Kurtz describes ten kinds. One basic reason for the growth of anti-science is the failure to educate the public about the nature of science. It is time, Kurtz says, for scientists and the scientifically literate to come forward to explain what science is as well as its practical effects. Last July I pointed out in an article in the Charlotte Observer, 'A Need to Engage the Public in Science," that according to a National Science Foundation report, science ranks behind ten other subjects in terms of people's interest. Politicians are an important part of the problem. By and large they reflect their constituents' and society lack of interest in science. Following Chris Mooney and Sheril Kirshenbaum's proposal in their book Unscientific America; How Scientific illiteracy Threatens Our Future, I pointed out that communicating the relevance of science to the public has been a low priority for scientists. Mooney and Kirshenbaum thus advocate development of a group of scientists who can be "ambassadors" to our larger society. A critical societal segment needing science education is, as Kurtz points out, the mass media.
The book's second section, "skepticism and the Nonnatural," consists of four chapters: one on skepticism and the paranormal and the other three on skepticism and religion, the last of which concerns the question of whether science and religion are compatible.
The third section, "Skepticism in the Human World," consists of a chapter concerning the need for skeptical inquiry in the political domain. Another chapter is devoted to skepticism and ethics. Kurtz describes three types of ethical skepticism. The one favored by Kurtz, ethical inquiry "involves a skeptical component that is never fully abandoned" (131). And in this view, the basic subject matter of ethics is behavior. Moral faith and ethical skepticism are the focus of the next chapter in which a modified form of ethical naturalism is proposed. In the last chapter in this section, Kurtz introduces a new field, eupraxsophy. Eupraxsophers will aim to be generalists able to understand, to the extent they can, what the sciences tell us. They will concern questions about the meaning of life and the relevance of the sciences and the arts to the choices we make. Universities and colleges need to develop the profession of eupraxsophy.
In the book's fourth section,"The Skeptical Movement, Past and Future," Kurtz recounts highlights of the new skepticism's history including his most significant personal activity in developing the enterprise. The book's last chapter is a "Statement of Principles" of the new skepticism.
Those of us of a certain age can remember when any person known to be a skeptic was considered at least deranged and probably unpatriotic, if not dangerous. Because of the indefatigable work of Paul Kurtz and some others, however, I suspect that many skeptics feel less compelled to keep their views to themselves. 'this conjecture is, of course, subject to inquiry. Most anti-skeptics probably think of skepticism in the sense that emphasizes doubt and the impossibility of knowledge as opposed to the new skepticism, which focuses on inquiry and the real possibility of knowledge.
Parts of this book are understandably repetitious-after all, they concern some topics addressed over the course of thirty years. But this could be beneficial for those being introduced to skepticism
SKEPTICAL INQUIRER July / August 2010