The fundamental principle of skepticism
Posted: 23 Jul 2009, 06:19
I used to label myself a skeptic (in the JREF sense: now I don't label myself a skeptic in any sense). As I have understood it for years, the fundamental principle of skepticism is this:
An extraordinary claims (i.e. claims divergent from the scientific consensus) must be justified (with proportional evidence of its predictive power) in order to be accepted.
If any skeptic wishes to defend this principle, I have three questions for you, to start the debate:
1. The principle assumes a specific epistemic view, the view that a claim must be judged on the basis of predictive power (i.e. if you claim that acupuncture is valid, you must show that putting needles in people in a certain way does what acupuncture says it does). If you find that there is a man that lives at the North Pole, in a big house, who makes toys, is that evidence for the existence of Santa Claus?
2. Why is the extraordinary nature of a claim measured by divergence from the scientific consensus? What about claims that have no relation to the scientific domain (such as moral, ethical or political claims) or claims made in domains where science is vastly impotent (such as economics, psychology or meteorology)?
3. Why do you believe in the scientific consensus as a standard of ordinariness? Why do you believe the scientific consensus, which is dictated by the capital-democratic system (of which the modern scientific institution is but a mouthpiece), has any relevance to epistemic concerns at all?
An extraordinary claims (i.e. claims divergent from the scientific consensus) must be justified (with proportional evidence of its predictive power) in order to be accepted.
If any skeptic wishes to defend this principle, I have three questions for you, to start the debate:
1. The principle assumes a specific epistemic view, the view that a claim must be judged on the basis of predictive power (i.e. if you claim that acupuncture is valid, you must show that putting needles in people in a certain way does what acupuncture says it does). If you find that there is a man that lives at the North Pole, in a big house, who makes toys, is that evidence for the existence of Santa Claus?
2. Why is the extraordinary nature of a claim measured by divergence from the scientific consensus? What about claims that have no relation to the scientific domain (such as moral, ethical or political claims) or claims made in domains where science is vastly impotent (such as economics, psychology or meteorology)?
3. Why do you believe in the scientific consensus as a standard of ordinariness? Why do you believe the scientific consensus, which is dictated by the capital-democratic system (of which the modern scientific institution is but a mouthpiece), has any relevance to epistemic concerns at all?